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I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two cases
that threw the phenomena of plea bargaining into high relief. In
Lafler v. Cooper' and Missouri v. Frye,' the Court was asked to
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University. Special thanks are due to my research
assistant, Max Compton, for his hard work on this article.
1. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
2. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
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decide whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
had been violated when the defendant received deficient advice
from his lawyer during plea bargaining and as a result either pro-
ceeded to trial and was convicted, or was forced to enter a later
guilty plea on worse terms, in either event causing him to receive
a more punitive sentence than he would have had he accepted the
plea offer. In answering this question in the affirmative, the
Court clarified two important points. First, plea bargaining rep-
resents a "critical stage" of a prosecution in which defendants are
fully entitled to effective legal representation. Second, provision of
a fair process-either an error-free trial or entry of a voluntary
guilty plea-does not wipe the constitutional slate clean. Preju-
dice, in other words, includes the loss of a tangible chance to min-
imize punishment, not merely the entry of an unreliable convic-
tion.
Notwithstanding the seeming narrowness of the issues before it,
in the course of its analysis the Court was forced to look broadly at
the role plea bargaining plays in the criminal justice system. With
uncharacteristic frankness, the Court "called it like it is," ac-
knowledging and citing academic assessments of plea bargaining
that have long been accepted as truisms by commentators but that
until recently have been ignored by the Court. After acknowledg-
ing that guilty pleas account for 97% of federal felony convictions
and 94% of state felony convictions, the Court explained why plea
bargaining must be subject to constitutional regulation:
Because ours "is for the most part a system of pleas, not a sys-
tem of trials," it is insufficient simply to point to the guaran-
tee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in
the pretrial process. "To a large extent . . . horse trading [be-
tween prosecutor and defense counsel] determine who goes to
jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is
not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the crim-
inal justice system."3
These observations provided the basis for the Court's conclusion
that poor lawyering that leads defendants to forgo plea offers to
their detriment contravenes the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel.
3. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Lafler,
132 S. Ct. at 1388; Robert Scott & William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
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The Court's frank recognition of the central role of plea bargain-
ing in the criminal justice system, and the accompanying need to
establish constitutional baselines to regulate it, suggest a poten-
tial jurisprudential turning point. This fact was not lost on Jus-
tice Scalia. In dissenting opinions in Frye and Lafler, Justice Scal-
ia scoffed at the Court's acknowledgement of plea bargaining's
central role in criminal justice and prophesied the emergence of a
"whole new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-
bargaining law."4 According to Justice Scalia, "[t]oday's opinions
deal with only two aspects of counsel's plea-bargaining inadequa-
cy, and leave other aspects (who knows what they might be?) to be
worked out in further constitutional litigation that will burden the
criminal process."'
At first blush, Justice Scalia's warnings about the emergence of
a new constitutional law of plea-bargaining seem a little strange.
After all, plea bargaining has been the subject of constitutional
regulation at least since Brady v. United States definitively estab-
lished that the practice does not violate the constitution.' Moreo-
ver, the parameters of that law have been fixed for decades.
Brady, along with several other decisions,'established a constitu-
tional framework within which plea bargaining can be conducted.
At the center of that framework is the requirement that, to pass
constitutional muster, guilty pleas must be voluntary and intelli-
gent.' The Court in Brady identified two reasons for the require-
ment. First, because a guilty plea was an "admission in open
court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment," the
defendant's plea would violate the self-incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment if the plea was not voluntary.' Accordingly,
criminal defendants may not be physically or mentally coerced
into pleading guilty and prosecutors may not materially misrepre-
sent the terms of bargains. At the same time, a guilty plea pro-
vides the "defendant's consent that judgment of conviction may be
entered without a trial" and thus is "a waiver of his right to trial
4. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting);see also Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting the "constitutionalization of the plea-bargaining pro-
cess").
5. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
7. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
8. See id. at 242 (stating that guilty pleas are valid if both "voluntary" and "intelli-
gent").
9. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
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before a jury or a judge.""o As the Court long has held, "[w]aivers
of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences."n Defendants
are thus constitutionally entitled, before pleading guilty, to be in-
formed of certain critical information necessary to make informed
plea-bargaining choices, including the nature of the charges, the
rights waived by pleading guilty, and the potential sentence that
can lawfully be imposed. Although plea bargains are less than
fully-enforceable executory agreements,12 promises upon which a
defendant relies in pleading guilty are enforceable and provide a
minimum floor of constitutional protection in the plea-bargaining
process.13
The Court added another important girder to its regulatory
plea-bargaining framework by making clear that the right to the
effective assistance of counsel extends to the plea process. In
McMann v. Richardson," and then more fully in Hill v. Lock-
hart," the Court held that defendants have a Sixth Amendment
right to competent legal advice regarding guilty pleas. Hill specif-
ically clarified that the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v.
Washington governs in the context of guilty pleas as well. Until
recently, this body of rules established the general parameters of
what might be considered "constitutional plea-bargaining law."
What then, could Scalia have meant when he warned of the im-
pending creation of a new constitutional field of plea-bargaining
law?
Here, I think Scalia had two things in mind. By and large, the
constitutional standards recognized by the Court to date are over-
whelmingly formalistic. As noted above, the heartland of plea-
bargaining law as it now stands is the requirement that guilty
pleas be entered into "voluntarily" and "intelligently." The volun-
tariness requirement ensures that criminal defendants are not
tricked or physically coerced into pleading guilty and that defend-
ants know what they are doing and make a conscious decision,
given the options available, to forgo their trial rights and accept
conviction and punishment. The intelligence requirement bolsters
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
13. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
14. 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
15. 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
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the voluntariness requirement by ensuring that a defendant is
fully informed of the charges to which he is pleading guilty and
the rights that he waives by doing so.
But consider what the voluntary and intelligent standards elide.
A guilty plea is voluntary notwithstanding its being compelled by
threat of enhanced punishment, as long as the threatened pun-
ishment itself can lawfully be imposed." And a guilty plea is in-
telligent notwithstanding that it may be entered with little
knowledge of the evidence admissible at trial or the likelihood that
trial will result in conviction." Guilty pleas that are the product
of coercive bargaining tactics, or predicated on threats of penal
consequences that fail to correspond with any rational penal objec-
tives apart from encouraging quick pleas are thus entirely ex-
empted from constitutional scrutiny under the Court's voluntari-
ness standards. Similarly, although defendants are entitled to
receive certain information about the legal charges against them,
the Court has never insisted that defendants receive what is, in
reality, the most important information needed to assess a plea
offer: information about the strength of the state's case and the
likelihood that a trial might result in an acquittal. This aspect of
plea bargaining has remained, until Lafler and Frye, almost en-
tirely unregulated.
The new constitutional plea-bargaining law foreseen by Justice
Scalia, I believe, might finally put substantive brick and mortar
on the formalistic skeleton of law that currently regulates-or
fails to regulate-what the Court now plainly concedes to be the
very essence of the criminal justice system. What may be loom-
ing-and what may have gotten Scalia's goat-in other words, is a
reconsideration of the substantive preconditions for truly volun-
tary and intelligent guilty pleas.
Justice Scalia's forebodings notwithstanding, such a reconsider-
ation is long overdue. As numerous scholars have noted, a combi-
nation of laissez-faire judicial attitudes towards plea-bargaining
tactics, combined with virtually unchecked prosecutorial charging
discretion, and aided and abetted by all-too-compliant legislatures,
has fundamentally altered American criminal justice." It is past
16. Brady, 397 U.S. at 751.
17. See id. at 757 ("A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he
discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quali-
ty of the State's case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action.") .
18. See, e.g., William Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline
of the Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 379 (Carol S. Steiker 2006).
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time for the pendulum to swing in the opposite direction. Pursu-
ing this course may require a sweeping reevaluation of plea-
bargaining tactics and procedures in ways still unforeseen, but the
need to set off on this path is clear. The task for the Court is to
begin to take plea bargaining, and the guilty plea process that ac-
counts for upwards of 95% of all state and federal felony convic-
tions, with the degree of seriousness that such a prominent fea-
ture of the criminal justice system deserves.
Lafler and Frye reflect the Court's emerging recognition of the
need to bring plea-bargaining processes more securely within the
ambit of constitutional regulation. Along with another recent
plea-bargaining case, Padilla v. Kentucky, "Lafler and Frye indi-
cate the Court's increasing abandonment of the concept of plea-
bargaining as an uninhibited free-for-all in which prosecutors
have carte blanche to offer criminal defendants whatever deals
they think convenient to dispose of cases, and defendants must
accept or reject those deals without a very good idea of the wisdom
of doing so, or any real alternative to pleading guilty on the terms
offered.20
The question that the Lafler and Frye cases squarely tee up,
then, is how voluntariness and intelligence should be constitu-
tionally construed. The answer to that question, I think, will
point us toward what this new constitutional plea-bargaining law
should look like. In this symposium contribution, I suggest two
initial steps. First, the Court should finally resolve the uncertain-
ty surrounding the application of Brady v. Maryland to plea bar-
gaining. Second, the Court should reassess prior plea-bargaining
precedents and seek to place meaningful boundaries on prosecuto-
rial bargaining coercion.
II. BRADY AND INTELLIGENT GUILTY PLEAS
A. Brady and Guilty Pleas
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court recognized that pros-
ecutors have an obligation under the due process clause to turn
over exculpatory evidence in their possession.21 The principle up-
on which its ruling was based, the Court explained, "is not pun-
19. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
20. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389-91 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
1410-11 (2012).
21. 373 U.S. at 87.
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ishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an
unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty
are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated un-
fairly."22
In the years since Brady was decided, the Court has clarified
the scope of the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.
Under current law, a prosecutor is obligated to produce exculpato-
ry evidence regardless of whether the defendant requests its pro-
duction. The good faith claim by the prosecutor that she was un-
aware of the existence of the evidence is no excuse as the prosecu-
tor assumes responsibility for knowing, not only what is in her
own files, but what evidence has been gathered by government
agents in general.23 The prosecutor is not, however, obligated to
open up her files for criminal defendants, nor must she turn over
all evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Rather, the duty to
disclose only applies to exculpatory evidence that is material to
conviction or punishment.24 As the Court clarified in United
States v. Bagley, exculpatory evidence meets the materiality
standard "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evi-
dence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."25
Just when the prosecutor must deliver Brady material to crimi-
nal defendants, however, has never been resolved by the Court.
Although it is clear that prosecutors have a duty to produce mate-
rial exculpatory evidence in advance of trial, the Supreme Court
has never stated whether exculpatory evidence need be produced
at an earlier stage. It is thus unclear whether a prosecutor has a
constitutional duty to produce exculpatory evidence to a criminal
defendant before a guilty plea is entered.
Among lower courts, there is widespread disagreement about
the scope of a prosecutor's disclosure obligations at the plea stage.
Four Federal Circuits-the Second,26 Eighth,27 Ninth28 , and
22. Id.
23. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995) (observing the prosecutor's "duty
to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in
the case, including the police," and that failure to disclose such material is a violation re-
gardless of good or bad faith).
24. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
25. 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
26. United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir.1998).
27. White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988).
28. Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.1995).
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Tenth2 9-have held that Brady applies at the guilty plea stage.
The Seventh Circuit has "strongly suggest[ed]" in dicta that Brady
applies at guilty pleas.o Although the First Circuit has not taken
a definitive position on the precise issue, in Ferrara v. United
States it held that under certain circumstances "the prosecution's
failure to disclose evidence may be sufficiently outrageous to con-
stitute the sort of impermissible conduct that is needed to ground
a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea."" Most state courts
reaching the issue have held that Brady applies to guilty pleas.32
In contrast, although support for the proposition that Brady
does not apply at the guilty plea stage is thin, the Fifth Circuit
has held that "Brady requires a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory
evidence for purposes of ensuring a fair trial, a concern that is ab-
sent when a defendant waives trial and pleads guilty,"" and that
Brady therefore does not apply to guilty pleas.34 The Fourth Cir-
cuit came close to so holding in the Moussaoui case.3 5 Several dis-
trict courts likewise have dismissed Brady challenges to guilty
pleas in habeas proceedings on the ground that there is no clearly
established federal law holding that Brady applies to guilty
pleas.3 6 Other circuits thus far have avoided taking sides on the
matter.37
29. United States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App'x 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005).
30. McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787-88 (7th Cir.2003).
31. 456 F.3d 278, 291 (1st Cir. 2006).
32. See, e.g., Carroll v. State, 474 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Gardner, 885
P.2d 1144 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State v.
Parsons, 775 A.2d 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); State v. Huebler, 275 P.3d 91(Nev.
2012); Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320 (S.C. 1999); State v. Davis, 823 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1991); Ex parte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697 (Tx. Crim. App. 1979); State v. Sturgeon,
605 N.W.2d 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
33. Orman v. Cain, 228 F.3d 616, 617 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353,
361-62 (5th Cir. 2000)).
34. United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that guilty plea
waives Brady claim); Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 360-62 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
35. See United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that
whether Moussaoui's Brady claim was foreclosed by circuit precedent holding that prosecu-
tors have no duty to disclose mitigating evidence that would be relevant during penalty
phase of capital trial prior to entry of guilty plea was "close," but declining ultimately to
reach issue).
36. See, e.g., Rosiere v. United States, Slip Copy, No. 11-4404(JBS), 2012 WL 4463876
(D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2012); Burley v. Prelesnik, Slip Copy, No. 11-CV-11258, 2012 WL
3887204 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2012); Ankeney v. Jones, Slip Copy, No. 12-cv-00808-LTB,
2012 WL 4378215 (D. Colo. July 17, 2012); Remedios v. United States, Nos. 10-23524-Civ-
Moreno, 09-20337--Cr-Moreno, 2011 WL 1598843, *11 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2011).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 816 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (assuming,
but not deciding, that Brady requires disclosure of material exculpatory evidence prior to
entry of guilty plea).
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Whatever tentative consensus the lower courts had reached by
2002, moreover, was thrown into doubt by the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Ruiz.3 1 In the Ruiz case, the defend-
ant Angela Ruiz was found in possession of thirty kilograms of
marijuana." Following standard practice in Southern California,
federal prosecutors offered Ruiz a "fast track" plea agreement.4 0
Per the agreement, in exchange for a substantial sentence conces-
sion, Ruiz had toforgo certain rights. 1 Although the agreement
expressly stipulated that the government would turn over "'any
[known] information establishing the factual innocence of the de-
fendant,' it required Ruiz to 'waiv[e] the right' to receive 'im-
peachment information relating to any informants or other wit-
nesses' as well as the right to receive information supporting any
affirmative defense the defendant raises if the case goes to trial."42
Ruiz refused to sign the agreement without removal of these
terms and, in response, the government withdrew the offer.43 Ruiz
nonetheless decided that she was better off pleading guilty than
contesting her case at trial."' As a result, Ruiz entered an open
plea, that is, a plea not tied to any offer, and thus forfeited the
sentencing benefit that she would have gotten had she accepted
the bargain.45 Ruiz appealed.46 Although the Ninth Circuit
agreed that the prosecutor had an obligation to produce material
exculpatory impeachment evidence prior to entry of a guilty plea,
the Supreme Court reversed.48
According to the Court, the Constitution does not require
"preguilty plea disclosure of impeachment information."4 9 Infor-
mation that might be useful to impeach witnesses, the Court rea-
soned, might help inform a defendant's decision to accept or reject
a plea offer but is not "critical information of which the defendant
must always be aware prior to pleading guilty."" After all, the
38. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).





44. Id. at 626.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 622
(2002).
48. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633.
49. Id. at 629.
50. Id. at 630.
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Court observed, "' [tIhere is no general constitutional right to dis-
covery in a criminal case."'5 ' The Court's cases construing the vol-
untary and intelligent standard for valid plea bargains, it noted,
have never required that a defendant be accurately informed of all
relevant circumstances that might impact the decision to enter a
plea.52 Such information, the Court reasoned, was "more closely
related to the fairness of a trial than to the voluntariness of the
plea."53
Significantly, the Court carefully limited its holding to exculpa-
tory impeachment evidence and evidence relating to affirmative
defenses. Because the plea agreement at issue in Ruiz required
the prosecutors to turn over "any information establishing the fac-
tual innocence of the defendant," the force of Ruiz's argument that
innocent defendants might plead guilty in the absence of disclo-
sure was, the Court noted, "diminishe[d]."5" The Court thus ex-
pressly declined to consider whether the same analysis applies to
substantive evidence of factual innocence.
Ruiz further muddied the waters about whether Brady applies
at the guilty plea stage. The Court's distinction in Ruiz between
information relevant to impeachment on one hand and infor-
mation relevant to the "factual innocence" of the defendant on the
other is particularly confusing given that the Court long ago ruled
that impeachment evidence should be treated no differently than
other types of exculpatory evidence for Brady purposes." Because
of its emphasis on Brady's purpose of ensuring fair trials, some
lower courts have interpreted Ruiz to mean that the assumption
that Brady applies generally at the guilty plea stage was incor-
rect. The Second Circuit, for instance, recently indicated that, in
light of Ruiz, it might reconsider its prior decisions holding that
Brady applies to guilty pleas." Other courts, however, have read
the tea leaves differently and taken Ruiz as a confirmation that,
at least as to non-impeachment exculpatory evidence, Brady does
51. Id. at 629 (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)).
52. Id. at 629-30.
53. Id. at 633 (discussing, specifically, the application of Ruiz's holding to information
pertinent to affirmative defenses).
54. Id. at 631.
55. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) ("When the 'reliability of a
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence
affecting credibility falls within [Brady's] rule requiring disclosure exculpatory evidence.").
56. See Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2010).
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apply to guilty pleas. In short, the courts continue to struggle
with this issue.
B. Lafler, Frye, Brady, and Plea Bargaining
Although the Court has permitted doubts about the prosecutor's
Brady obligations at the plea stage to fester, Lafler and Frye
should trigger resolution of this important issue. To be sure,
Lafler and Frye are firmly grounded in the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, while Brady's disclosure requirement stems from
basic due process concerns. Concern about the voluntary and in-
telligent nature of guilty pleas is likewise an element of due pro-
cess. Nonetheless, as this section discusses, the concerns about
the integrity of plea bargaining reflected in Lafler and Frye trans-
cend the specific requirements of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. They are, ultimately, due process concerns that neces-
sarily spill over into other facets of the guilty plea proceeding, as
Justice Scalia's sarcastic asides concerning new plea-bargaining
law rightly acknowledge.
To set the stage for the following discussion, I first set forth a
more detailed account of the Lafler and Frye cases. In Lafler,
Blaine Cooper was charged with several offenses, including, inter
alia, assault with intent to murder after shooting the victim in the
buttock, hip, and abdomen." While the case was pending, the
prosecuting attorney twice offered to dismiss two of the charges
and to recommend a sentence on the remaining counts of 51 to 85
months.5 1 Cooper's attorney, however, told Cooper that "the pros-
ecution would be unable to establish his intent to murder [the vic-
tim] because she had been shot below the waist."6 0 Relying on this
patently shoddy advice, Cooper rejected the plea offers and stood
trial on the charges, where he was convicted on all counts."
Cooper then received a mandatory minimum sentence of 185 to
360 months imprisonment.62 On appeal, Cooper argued that his
attorney's advice to reject the plea offers constituted ineffective
57. See, e.g., McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting
that dicta in Ruiz "strongly suggests" a due process violation would exist if the prosecution
withheld exculpatory evidence, and not merely impeachment evidence, prior to entry of a
guilty plea).







assistance of counsel.6 ' The trial court, and the Michigan Court of
Appeals, rejected the claim.' A federal district court, however,
found merit in the claim and issued a conditional writ of habeas
corpus, concluding that the proper remedy for the violation was
specific performance, and that Michigan was obliged to reinstate
its original plea offers. After the Sixth Circuit affirmed, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari." The Court too
agreed that Cooper's right to the effective assistance of counsel
had been violated. Michigan conceded that the advice given by
Cooper's attorney was constitutionally deficient,"6 but contended
that since Cooper had received a fair trial, he had suffered no
prejudice within the meaning of Strickland v. Washingtono and
Hill v. Lockhart." The key issue before the Court, therefore, was
whether deficient representation that deprives a defendant of the
potential benefits of plea bargaining constitutes a constitutionally
cognizable harm.72 The Court concluded that it does:
If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right
to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to ac-
cept it. If that right is denied, prejudice can be shown if loss
of the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction
on more serious charges or the imposition of a more severe
sentence.73
In reaching this conclusion, the Court clarified several im-
portant points. First, the Court reiterated that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel applies, not just to guilty pleas generally,
but specifically to plea bargaining.74 Second, the Court explained
that a narrow construction of the Sixth Amendment as protecting
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Cooper v. Lafler, No. 06-11068, 2009 WL 817712, at *9-10 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26,
2009), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
66. Cooper v. Lafler, 376 F. App'x 563, 575 (6th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1376
(2012).
67. Lafler v. Cooper, 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011).
68. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390-91.
69. Id. at 1384.
70. 466 U.S. 668 (1984), superseded by statute on other grounds, Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, as recognized in
United States y. Matthews, 68 M.J. 29, 38 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
71. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
72. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384.
73. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387.
74. Id. at 1384.
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solely "the right to a fair trial" was inappropriate.7 ' The Sixth
Amendment safeguards defendants at all critical stages of a crim-
inal prosecution, of which plea-bargaining is one." Third, the
Court emphasized the Sixth Amendment's concerns extended be-
yond merely safeguarding the accuracy of criminal convictions."
That Cooper was ultimately convicted in a fair trial of the charged
offense did not mean that counsel's ineffective advice was not
prejudicial.7 ' The loss of a punishment minimizing plea oppor-
tunity dramatically worsened Cooper's ultimate sentence, causing
him "to lose benefits he would have received in the ordinary course
but for counsel's ineffective assistance."
Missouri v. Fryeso involved similar concerns about incompetent
representation in plea-bargaining. Galin Frye was arrested after
having been stopped while driving with a revoked license."' Be-
cause this was Frye's fourth such offense, he was charged with a
class D felony carrying with it a maximum sentence of four years
imprisonment.82 Some months later, the prosecutor presented
Frye's attorney a written plea offer, in which the prosecutor of-
fered Frye the opportunity to plead guilty to a misdemeanor, for
which the prosecutor would recommend a 90-day sentence."
Frye's lawyer, however, never transmitted the offer to his client
and it expired.' Frye subsequently entered an "open" guilty plea
to the felony charge." Days prior to the sentencing hearing, how-
ever, Frye was once again caught driving with a revoked license."
The sentencing judge sentenced Frye to three years in prison.
75. Id. at 1385.
76. Id. at 1385-86.
77. Id. at 1386.
78. Id. at 1388.
79. Id.
80. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
81. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
82. Id. at 1399, 1404.
83. Id. at 1404. The prosecutor also alternatively offered to permit Frye to plead guilty
to a felony in exchange for a sentence recommendation of 3-years, no recommendation on





87. Id. at 1404-05. Although there was no plea agreement, the prosecutor's sentencing
recommendations conformed to one of the plea offers that had been made: the prosecutor
recommended a three-year sentence, made no recommendation as to probation, and asked
for 10-days ofjail shock time. Id. at 1404.
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Frye then sought post-conviction relief in state court, claiming
that his lawyer's failure to communicate the plea offers in a timely
fashion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel."8 The lower
court rejected Frye's petition, but the Missouri Court of Appeals
found that Frye received incompetent advice and reversed." The
United States Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals
that Frye had received incompetent advice."0 According to the
Court, "defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers
from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that
may be favorable to the accused."" Because Frye's lawyer failed
to perform that basic duty, the Court held that Frye did not re-
ceive the effective assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees.9 2 However, because there was some question, given
the intervening offense, regarding whether the prosecutor would
have revoked the offer to plead guilty to a misdemeanor offense or
whether the trial court would have accepted a misdemeanor plea,
the Court remanded the case to the Missouri Court of Appeals to
determine whether Frye could establish prejudice under the se-
cond prong of the Strickland test."
In one sense, the Lafler and Frye cases are "no big deal."94 Nei-
ther Lafler nor Frye heralds a change in constitutional criminal
procedure, and there will be no Lafler-Frye revolution like that
which followed in the wake of Apprendi v. New Jersey with respect
to sentencing, or Crawford v. Washington with respect to the Con-
frontation Clause." Rather, Lafler and Frye settle a minor issue
regarding application of the right to effective assistance of counsel
in plea-bargaining in a manner consistent with the established
practices of most of the lower courts. And yet, in another sense, as
Justice Scalia's dissent suggests, these cases potentially foretell a
transformational evolution of criminal procedure.
Frye and Lafler make clear, if there was ever any doubt, that
plea-bargaining constitutes a "critical stage" of a criminal prosecu-
88. Id. at 1405.
89. Frye v. State, 311 S.W.3d 350, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1399
(2012).
90. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
91. Id. at 1408.
92. Id. at 1410.
93. Id. at 1411.
94. Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafier: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39 (June 21,
2012).
95. A Westlaw search, for example, turns up 230 law review articles mentioning
Apprendi or Crawford in the title.
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tion. Because plea-bargaining "is" the criminal justice system,
basic due process rules must apply to "the negotiation of a plea
bargain." The implications of that clarification may take years to
play out, but the Court expressly recognized at least two of those
implications. The first implication, of course, is that criminal de-
fendants are entitled to constitutionally competent representation
by their attorneys in plea-bargaining. The second clear implica-
tion of Frye and Lafler is that prosecutorial conduct of plea-
bargaining is itself subject to due process constraints. As Justice
Scalia warned in dissent: "it would be foolish to think that 'consti-
tutional' rules governing counsel's behavior will not be followed by
rules governing the prosecution's behavior in the plea-bargaining
process that the Court today announces 'is the criminal justice
system.""' Scalia, of course, is precisely correct. The recognition
of plea-bargaining as a critical stage in the criminal justice pro-
cess necessarily means that both prosecutors and defense counsel
must conduct bargaining within minimum constitutional parame-
ters. The prosecutor's obligation to disclose material Brady evi-
dence prior to negotiating a plea agreement should be the first,
albeit not the last, obligation formally recognized by the Court in a
post-Lafler-Frye world. Such an obligation has already been rec-
ognized as an ethical responsibility."
At minimum, then, these cases set the stage for resolution of the
issue of Brady's applicability to guilty pleas." They do so in three
main ways. First, they suggest a more robust conception of what
an intelligent guilty plea entails. Second, they reflect a recogni-
tion that prejudice must be measured against the range of out-
comes that are typically produced through plea-bargaining, and
not solely against rarely triggered trial outcomes. Third, they
make clear that entry of a valid guilty plea does not waive consti-
96. Laf/er, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
97. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(D) (2012) (requiring prosecutors to
'make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecu-
tor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense"); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009) (clarifying that disclosure must
be made pre-plea to satisfy "significant purpose" of assisting defendants in making intelli-
gent plea-bargaining decisions); see generally Daniel Conte, Swept Under the Rug: The
Brady Disclosure Obligation in a Pre-Plea Context, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvOC. 74,
80-82 (2012) (discussing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 3.8(D) (2012) and ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009).
98. Some courts have already begun to make this connection. See, e.g., Gladwell v.
Decamp, No. 3:10-cv-00061-BR, 2012 WL 5182804, at *7 n.5 (D. Or. Oct. 16, 2012) (recog-
nizing, but not reaching the issue, of whether Frye and Lafler might strengthen conclusion
that Brady applies at the guilty plea stage).
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tutional claims regarding the state's failure to ensure that a de-
fendant was provided with the means to make a rational, minimal
assessment of the practical value of a plea offer.
1. Lawyers Require Disclosure of Brady Material to Counsel
Their Clients Effectively Regarding Whether to Enter a
Guilty Plea
A lawyer's duty to provide effective assistance of counsel en-
compasses a wide range of duties, the specific content of which
depends on the local practices and conventions that dictate what
counts as reasonable under "prevailing professional norms.""
Although the Court in Strickland stated that the purpose of the
right was to "ensure a fair trial,"o it has subsequently made
clear-as was underscored in Lafler and Frye -that the right to
the effective assistance of counsel extends beyond ensuring a fair
trial and encompasses all stages of the criminal process, including
the guilty-plea process."o1
At minimum, effective assistance imposes upon counsel duties
of loyalty, an obligation to consult with clients regarding im-
portant decisions, to advocate for the defendant, and to "bring to
bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable
adversarial testing process."'02 To perform such duties, the Court
has repeatedly recognized that counsel must provide accurate le-
gal advice to clients, and to do so, must make a reasonable inves-
tigation of the law and facts or, absent that, proffer a reasonable
justification for failing to do so.' In formulating and applying
these principles, the Court has repeatedly looked to the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice ("ABA Standards") for guidance
while acknowledging that those standards do not represent a per-
formance floor for effective assistance under the Sixth Amend-
ment.'0 4 Indeed, the Court's opinion in Frye cited the ABA Stand-
ards in support of the conclusion that, "as a general rule, defense
counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prose-
99. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
100. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
101. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384; Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012).
102. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
103. Id. at 681 (noting that decisions not to investigate deserve deference "commensu-
rate with the reasonableness of the professional judgments on which they are based").
104. See, e.g., Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.2(a) (3d ed. 1999)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
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cution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favor-
able to the accused." 10 5
Similarly, the ABA Standards make clear that competent advice
in plea-bargaining must be predicated on adequate investigation.
ABA Standard 14-3.2(b), for instance, provides that to proffer the
competent advice to which defendants considering a plea of guilty
are entitled, defense counsel should make an "appropriate investi-
gation" of the relevant facts and law.' 6 Specifically, the Standard
states that "[d]efense counsel should not recommend to a defend-
ant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate investigation and
study of the case has been completed."o' In addition, ABA Stand-
ard 4-6.1(b) on the defense function warns that "[u]nder no cir-
cumstances should defense counsel recommend to a defendant ac-
ceptance of a plea unless appropriate investigation and study of
the case has been completed, including an analysis of controlling
law and the evidence likely to be introduced at trial."0o Given the
Court's repeated emphasis on the importance of adequate investi-
gation, at least in capital cases, as a component of effective assis-
tance, counsel's duty to make some minimally sufficient investiga-
tion prior to advising a client to plead guilty is both consistent
with the Court's Sixth Amendment case law and logically appar-
ent. Accordingly, it seems plain after Lafler and Frye that compe-
tent advice in plea-bargaining not only requires knowledge of the
nature of the charges lodged and the consequences of conviction,
but also reasonable awareness of the evidence upon which the
state would rely were the case to proceed to trial. Indeed, in a re-
cent decision, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a lawyer's failure to
investigate the facts of his client's case before advising the client
to her detriment to withdraw her guilty plea plainly constituted
ineffective assistance in the wake of Lafler and Frye.'9 It follows
from this that a competent lawyer is obligated to investigate, at
minimum and to the extent reasonably possible, the extant excul-
patory evidence, both through independent means and by making
timely discovery requests from the state. Indeed, in Hill v. Lock-
105. Frye,132 S. Ct. at 1408.
106. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY§ 14-3.2(b) (3d ed. 1999).
107. Id.
108. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DUTY To EXPLORE DISPOSITION WITHOUT
TRIAL § 4-6.1(b) (3d ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
109. See Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577, 590 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the lawyer
"had no way to adequately advise [the client] on her sentencing exposure at trial or on the




hart the Supreme Court said as much. In clarifying the applica-
tion of the Strickland prejudice prong to a challenge to a guilty
plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court used as
an example a claim "where the alleged error of counsel is a failure
to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence. "11 Ac-
cording to the Court, such a claim would prevail upon a showing
that "the error 'prejudiced' the defendant by causing him to plead
guilty rather than go to trial."'
It is, therefore, clear that defense counsel's failure to discover
exculpatory evidence that an appropriate investigation would
have revealed constitutes a prima facie case of ineffective assis-
tance. Although the kind of investigation needed to discover criti-
cal exculpatory evidence might not always be apparent to a com-
petent lawyer, where such evidence could be had merely by mak-
ing a timely request of exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor,
the obligation to discover such evidence would surely apply, and,
Hill makes clear, failure to do so would be grounds for an ineffec-
tive assistance claim.
If a lawyer's culpable failure to discover material exculpatory
evidence undermines the reliability of a guilty plea, it ineluctably
follows that so does the prosecutor's failure to disclose that evi-
dence even in the absence of any deficient performance by a crimi-
nal defendant's lawyer. Indeed, as United States v. Bagley estab-
lished, the duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence does not
turn on whether the defendant's lawyer has made a discovery re-
quest for such evidence, nor even whether the prosecutor is per-
sonally aware of the existence of such evidence, because the Brady
rule is not a culpability-based standard.112 Rather, as the Court
explained, "[t]heBrady rule is based on the requirement of due
process. Its purpose is not to displace the adversary system as the
primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a
miscarriage of justice does not occur."'
Lafler and Frye likewise stand as an acknowledgment that mis-
carriages of justice may occur as a result of plea-bargaining as
well as at trial. In short then, because competent counsel has a
constitutional obligation to provide competent advice to clients at
the plea-bargaining stage, and because the provision of such ad-
110. 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
111. Id.
112. 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
113. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.
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vice, under widely-accepted ethical canons and as recognized in
prior Supreme Court cases, is impossible without an adequate in-
vestigation into available material exculpatory evidence, there is
no question that a lawyer has a constitutional duty to seek out
such evidence from the prosecutor before advising his or her client
to enter a guilty plea. Because what is at issue here is the due
process concern that defendants will be railroaded into entering
guilty pleas unintelligently-that is, without the minimum infor-
mation necessary to make a truly voluntary choice to waive essen-
tial constitutional rights-the duty extends to prosecutors as well
as defense counsel. In short, because prosecutors have an inde-
pendent duty to provide material exculpatory evidence regardless
of whether defense counsel requests it, it seems to follow that
prosecutors are obligated to turn over such information to the
same extent that defense lawyers are obligated to seek it out.
2. The Prosecutor's Ethical and Constitutional Obligations
in Plea Bargaining Include Disclosure of Brady Material
Opposition to requiring disclosure of Brady material at the plea
stage is often justified on the ground that defendants are aware of
their guilt or innocence and thus do not require a full understand-
ing of the evidence prior to entering a plea.114 As the following
section argues, this view is misguided for several reasons. First,
although it is likely. true that criminal defendants commonly know
whether they are, in fact, guilty of the offenses for which they
have been charged, it is also virtually certain that some defend-
ants do not know the critical facts needed to assess their own guilt
or innocence. Second, knowledge of innocence, even when availa-
ble, is not, in practical terms, the primary consideration in plea-
bargaining. Because there are substantial penal discounts availa-
ble through plea-bargaining that would be unavailable upon con-
viction at trial, rational criminal defendants, regardless of guilt or
innocence, will base their decisions on whether to plead guilty on
the size of the plea discount offered, the probability of conviction
at trial, and the costs of contesting the case. In making this as-
114. As Justice Scalia asserted during the oral argument of the Ruiz case, it's unneces-
sary to provide discovery to defendants who want to assert, say, self-defense, because "it's
impossible for [the defendant] not to know whether he was acting in self-defense." See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32-33, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (No. 01-
595), quoted and discussed in Stephanos Bibas, Regulating The Plea-Bargaining Market:
From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1183 n.83 (2011).
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sessment, knowledge of what evidence will be admissible at trial is
critical. Knowledge that one is innocent, unaccompanied by the
ability to prove it, is a cause for depression but absolutely irrele-
vant to the rational decision to plead guilty."' Third, there is now
substantial empirical evidence that demonstrates that innocent
defendants do, in fact, plead guilty. That evidence confirms that
false guilty pleas are a problem that the legal system has an obli-
gation to address.
i. It Is Simply Not True That All Defendants Know the
Key Facts Determining Their Criminal Liability
When They Enter a Plea
Lack of knowledge of one's own guilt or innocence can arise in a
variety of circumstances. Some criminal defendants, because of
mental illness or intellectual disability, may simply not remember
precisely what transpired during an alleged crime, or exactly what
role they played during complex, emotionally-charged, and fast-
unfolding events. Such individuals, moreover, are often especially
susceptible to suggestion and may be led to believe by investiga-
tors or overzealous interrogators that they engaged in conduct in
which, in fact, they did not engage.
Problems with personal recollection of allegedly criminal con-
duct may arise from other causes as well. Indeed, the passage of
time alone might cloud otherwise sound memories and make it
difficult for a defendant to remember with the necessary degree of
clarity where he or she was, or what his or her role had been, dur-
ing a particular transaction. Difficulty in accurately remembering
events, moreover, may often be exacerbated by the use of intoxi-
cants. It would not be surprising to discover that many criminal
defendants simply cannot recall with certainty events that took
place while they were stoned, drunk, or high. Given the docu-
mented large percentage of prisoners with mental illness and sub-
stance abuse problems and the extraordinarily high percentage of
convictions obtained through guilty pleas, it would be surprising if
substantial numbers of criminal defendants did not plead guilty
despite a basic lack of personal knowledge about the facts deter-
mining their actual guilt. Failure to apply Brady to guilty pleas
means that innocent defendants will more often enter false guilty
115. This is true at least if one assumes that minimization of punishment is the primary




pleas due to lack of understanding of evidence or their role in the
criminal transaction.
ii. Guilty Pleas as Tactical Choices Rather than Con-
fessions
The notion that the decision to plead guilty should be divorced
from any meaningful assessment of the strength of the evidence in
the case and based solely on the defendant's honest assessment of
his or her personal culpability reflects a naive and unrealistic un-
derstanding of the modern criminal justice system. The Supreme
Court long ago rejected this view in North Carolina v. Alford,
holding that a criminal defendant's guilty plea was valid notwith-
standing accompanying claims of innocence as long as there was a
"factual basis" for the plea.n' Disallowing such pleas would force
defendants who believe themselves innocent to lie or forgo the
substantial benefits of plea-bargaining. The implausibility of in-
terpreting a guilty plea as an honest confession, moreover, was
reinforced in the Lafler and Frye decisions. As the Court noted,
the reason that criminal defendants are entitled to competent ad-
vice during plea-bargaining, and the reason that a fair trial of a
defendant who received incompetent plea-bargaining advice from
his or her lawyer does not wash the slate clean, is that the plea
process constitutes the primary mechanism for assessing culpabil-
ity and distributing punishment.' "To a large extent . . . horse
trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who
goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is.'""
Defendants need access to exculpatory evidence in order to make
intelligent decisions about plea offers and to ensure that any plea
offer accepted adequately discounts punishment in light of weak-
nesses in the state's case.
iii. Exonerees and Guilty Pleas: The Evidence of a False
Guilty Plea Problem
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it has become increas-
ingly apparent that actually innocent defendants do plead guilty.
Innocence, while a relevant consideration for a defendant charged
116. 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).
117. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.1399, 1407 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.1376,
1384 (2012).
118. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargain-
ing as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992) (emphasis in original).
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with a criminal offense who is considering whether or not to enter
a guilty plea, is not a dispositive consideration and does not pre-
vent criminal defendants from pleading guilty."19
The fact that innocent individuals plead guilty has been empiri-
cally documented. According to current data in the National Reg-
istry of Exonerations ("Registery"), nine percent of exonerated de-
fendants were convicted by guilty plea.12 0As the Registry's compil-
ers acknowledge, this figure almost certainly vastly undercounts
the number of innocent individuals who plead guilty, as the prac-
tical barriers to exoneration following guilty pleas, including the
lack of a trial record and the routine waiver of appellate and col-
lateral review, make it far harder to obtain post-conviction re-
lief.121
My own research on exonerees in the Rampart and Tulia scan-
dals indicates that, at least under certain conditions, wrongly ac-
cused innocent defendants routinely plead guilty. In both Ram-
part and Tulia, large numbers of prisoners were exonerated after
it was discovered that law enforcement officials had engaged in
large-scale misconduct causing the wrongful conviction of scores of
innocent persons. Police misconduct ranged from the planting of
false evidence to police perjury.12 In those two scandals, of sixty
four actually innocent exonerees, 81%, or 52 out of 64, pled guilty
after having been falsely accused of engaging in criminal conduct
by untruthful police officers.12 Only 19% of the Rampart and
Tulia exonerees initially opted to contest the charges at trial.124
The experience of innocent exonerees in the Rampart and Tulia
incidents suggests that innocent defendants plead guilty for at
least three important reasons. First, they plead guilty because the
evidence they expect the state to offer at trial-which they know
to be false-nonetheless would likely be compelling to neutral ju-
rors and judges. Where innocent defendants are convinced that
119. See Gregory Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions, and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 143, 171 (observing that the "reasons people plead guilty after plea bargaining are
numerous, and actual guilt has little bearing on the calculus.").
120. See National Registry of Exonerations, available at
http://www.law.umich.edulspecial/exoneration/Pages/detaiUist.aspx?View={FAF6EDDB-
5A68-4F8F-8A52-2C61F5BF9EA7)&FilterFieldl=Group&FilterValuel=P# (reporting that
93 of 1022 exonerations involved guilty pleas).
121. Id.
122. See Russell D. Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. (2013) (forthcoming) (detailing circumstances in both Rampart and Tulia
scandals).




their claims of innocence are likely to go unheeded, guilty pleas
look like rational behavior.
Second, innocent defendants likely plead guilty in many cases
for the same reason that guilty defendants plead guilty: because
the offer is too good to refuse. Routine and systematic use of large
trial penalties compel all defendants, including innocent ones, to
accept plea offers in order to limit their penal exposure. Com-
pared with trial sentences, the costs of pleading guilty are often
relatively small, particularly for defendants who are incarcerated
pretrial and expect to serve a substantial portion of their expected
plea sentences before their cases get to trial in any event. In addi-
tion, the disincentive to pleading guilty to a felony charge is sub-
stantially reduced for defendants with previous criminal convic-
tions, given that they already have absorbed many of the collat-
eral costs of felony conviction.
A third reason many innocent defendants plead guilty is that
they perceive, often correctly, that they will not receive a fair and
unbiased hearing in the local courts. These concerns are especially
pronounced for members of ethnic minorities who must appear
before racially-biased judges and juries, for defendants with crim-
inal records concerned that revelation of their records will bias
factfinders against them, and for indigents represented by under-
funded and overburdened defense lawyers. Such defendants are
simply not in a position to demand a jury trial, even when they are
in fact innocent, because they reasonably fear that their lawyers
will not have the resources or interest to undertake the kind of
full-throttle defense necessary to undermine a facially-plausible
government case, and that even if they did, the decision makers in
their cases might well hold one thumb on the scales of justice.
Extending Brady disclosure to guilty plea proceedings would
help to counter these factors and thereby reduce the likelihood of a
plea-stage miscarriage of justice. Disclosure of exculpatory evi-
dence would help to counteract defendant resignation in the face
of misleading inculpatory evidence. Such evidence exists in a wide
variety of forms but commonly includes victim or eyewitness misi-
dentifications, false confessions, faulty forensic evidence, false ac-
cusations of criminal misconduct, and occasionally, police wrong-
doing. Where material exculpatory evidence exists, defendants
need access to that evidence to make reasoned, accurate decisions
about whether to contest the criminal charges against them.
Given the often enormous trial penalties that defendants con-
front, access to material exculpatory evidence will not always pre-
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vent a defendant - even an innocent one - from pleading guilty.
However, knowledge of the existence of that evidence will assist
counsel to negotiate plea agreements that properly reflect the true
probabilities of conviction and acquittal at trial. Having disclosed
material exculpatory evidence, prosecutors will be under pressure
to offer, and defense lawyers empowered to demand, more signifi-
cant plea discounts to entice defendants to forgo their right to tri-
al. Risk-averse defendants might well prefer to accept more leni-
ent plea offers rather than roll the dice at trial, and these lenient
plea-offers, from an economic perspective, offer a more accurate
valuation of the defendant's plea-waiver than an uninformed
guilty plea would have, and thus a fairer and more just resolution
of the criminal accusation.
In addition, disclosure of material exculpatory evidence would
impact the receptivity of the forum to the defendant's innocence
claims in important ways. Upon disclosure of exculpatory evi-
dence, overburdened defense lawyers might well choose to reallo-
cate their resources from other cases in recognition of the en-
hanced likelihood that the defendant is innocent or at least can
proffer a more plausible defense at trial. That information might
prompt further pre-plea investigation, which might impact not
only the terms of settlement but also the decision whether or not
to enter a plea at all. Second, secure in the knowledge that the
judge and jury will learn about favorable evidence, defendants
might feel more confident about declining plea offers and more
willing to contest criminal charges at trial.
"Intelligent" guilty pleas are those made not only with an
awareness of the consequences of the guilty plea, but of the oppor-
tunity costs of foregoing trial. Ideally, defense counsel would have
full access to all of the evidence available to prosecutors prior to
advising clients to plead guilty. Long-recognized limits on the
prosecutor's discovery obligations make that goal impractical, but
by ensuring that Brady material, at the least, is made available to
defendants before they enter guilty pleas, the Court can add criti-
cal substance to the requirement that pleas be made "intelligent-
ly."
III. ENHANCING THE VOLUNTARINESS REQUIREMENT
An intelligent plea is not always, however, enough. After all,
the choice to hand over the money to the robber rather than be
shot in the head also represents a perfectly intelligent choice, just
not a fair one. For plea-bargaining law to do justice to criminal
Vol. 51618
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defendants, it must ensure that guilty pleas are voluntary in a
more robust sense than is currently recognized. The Court has
never established any substantive rules regarding how bargains
are reached. In essence, virtually anything and everything can be
a bargaining chip. More importantly, the Court has largely taken
a hands-off approach to prosecutorial bargaining tactics in the
shadow of unconstrained prosecutorial discretion over charging
decisions. Having treated prosecutorial charging discretion as
sacrosanct, the Court has permitted prosecutors to make charging
decisions, not based on a prosecutor's honest assessment of what
an appropriate penalty might be, but for the express purpose of
inducing defendants to plead guilty to avoid heightened, and in
some cases truly egregious, sanctions.
That, of course, was what was at issue in Bordenkircher v.
Hayes.'25 In Bordenkircher, the defendant, Hayes, a two-time prior
offender, was charged with uttering a forged check for
$88.30.1 26Although initially he could have been charged under the
state's habitual criminal statute, the prosecutor instead made a
plea offer in which Hayes could plead guilty to a count of forgery
and a prosecutorial recommendation of a five-year
tence.'27Perhaps believing five-years for forging an $88 check to be
unduly harsh, Hayes refused the offer.'28He lived to regret it. The
prosecutor filed a superseding indictment charging Hayes as a
habitual criminal, Hayes lost at trial, and the judge had no choice
but to sentence Hayes to a mandatory life term.129
Hayes sought on appeal to get his conviction reversed on
grounds that the prosecutor's bargaining tactics were either coer-
cive or punitive,sobut the United States Supreme Court upheld
the conviction and sentence.Miln the Court's view, "in the 'give-
and-take' of plea-bargaining, there is no such element of punish-
ment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject
the prosecution's offer."' 32According to the Court, as long as the
prosecutor selects charges from among those duly made available
by the legislature, and for which probable cause exists, he or she
125. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
126. 434 U.S. at 358.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 359.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 365.
132. Id. at 363.
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has the discretion to charge as he or she sees fit and to bargain
without restriction within that range. 133The Court downplayed the
danger that hard bargaining tactics might compel innocent de-
fendants to plead guilty.134 According to the Court, "[d]efendants
advised by competent counsel and protected by other procedural
safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in re-
sponse to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to
false self-condemnation.""'By sanctioning these prosecutorial tac-
tics, the Court signaled its unwillingness to step into the plea-
bargaining fray, and in so doing, significantly weakened defend-
ants' bargaining power. As Scott and Stuntz observed, as long as
prosecutors can penalize a defendant's refusal to plead guilty by
seeking substantially harsher penalties, defendants will have lit-
tle choice but to accept offers on prosecutors' terms.136
Bordenkircher has been roundly condemned by commentators. 3 7
Nonetheless, the Court has never wavered from the path on which
it set off there. Lafler and Frye's recognition of the dynamic inter-
play between discretion and constitutional regulation in the plea-
bargaining process, however, suggests that there may be a differ-
ent direction open to the Court.
Numerous commentators have criticized plea-bargaining offers
involving enormous trial penalties or plea discounts as inherently
coercive.' Where defendants are asked to choose between going
to trial and thereby risking heavy sanctions and entering guilty
pleas in exchange for only minor penalties, contrary to the Court's
disclaimer, the choice may indeed be so coercive as to undermine
the accuracy of the resulting conviction. Likewise, a plea offer ac-
companied by a threat to file enhanced charges, as occurred in
Bordenkircher, may be so coercive as to undermine both the volun-
tariness of the waiver of the defendant's right to trial and the reli-
ability of the conviction.
133. Id. at 364.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 363.
136. Scott, supra note 117, at 1964 ("Hayes might not have accepted that deal, but every
future defendant is likely to do so and do so quickly.").
137. See, e.g., Michael M. O'Hear, The End of Bordenkircher: Extending the Logic of
Apprendi Plea Bargaining , 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 835, 837 (2006).
138. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey Of
Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155, 1174 (2005) (arguing that the "shock-
ing thing about Bordenkircher is not the existence of a trial penalty but the coercive size of
that penalty"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process Of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733,




As I have argued elsewhere, the fact of unconstrained prosecu-
torial charge discretion means that the solution to this problem
cannot simply be to limit the acceptable size of plea discounts."'
There are too many ways in which prosecutors can evade such
rules. The key is to recognize that plea offers are not purely in-
substantial events about which the law cannot take cognizance.
Rather, a prosecutor's plea offer represents the prosecutor's sub-
stantive assessment of what constitutes an appropriate resolution
of the alleged criminal incident. The momentous nature of a plea
offer was expressly observed in Lafler. As the Court there noted, a
plea offer embodies, and thereby identifies, "a sentence the prose-
cution evidently deem[s] consistent with the sound administration
of criminal justice," and one that approximates "the sentence he or
others in his position would have received in the ordinary
course."140 It is thus perfectly fair to make a comparative assess-
ment of the sentence that a prosecutor was willing to offer to re-
solve the case and the punishment that ultimately was sought at
trial. While resolution by plea necessarily entails awarding de-
fendants appropriate plea discounts to compensate them for forgo-
ing their costly trial rights and encouraging their acceptance of
responsibility, and for conserving prosecutorial resources, protect-
ing victims and witnesses from the burden and trauma of testify-
ing, and the like, voluntariness and accuracy concerns require lim-
its on the acceptable magnitude of those discounts.
In addition, Frye's recognition that defense attorneys have a
constitutional duty to transmit plea offers to their clients
acknowledges the important role that plea offers play in modern
criminal process. The communication of a plea offer is a "critical
stage" of a criminal prosecution, representing as it does the terms
upon which the state is at least tentatively prepared to resolve the
criminal matter and which, in the vast majority of cases, does in
fact lead to its resolution. The constitutional import of the plea
offer, moreover, is not undermined by the fact that prosecutors
retain the power to revoke plea offers until the guilty plea is ac-
cepted by a court. The existence of prosecutorial discretion to
make, withhold, and retract plea offers does not detract from their
import, nor negate counsel's obligation to communicate them to
their clients.
139. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237 (2008).
140. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012).
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A defendant's right to be informed of a plea offer, notwithstand-
ing the defendant's lack of any right to receive one, is but one ex-
ample of the contingent quality of many legal rights. A wide vari-
ety of rights come into existence only upon the doing of some dis-
cretionary act by another party. The right to trial depends on a
prosecutor's discretionary decision to file charges. The right to
cross-examine a witness depends on the other party's discretion-
ary decision to call the witness in the first place and so on. That
legal rights are contingent on the circumstances in which they
operate simply does not undermine their force when the prerequi-
sites for their attachment are satisfied.
If the extension of a plea offer can trigger a constitutional right
to be informed of the offer, as Frye held, it might also trigger other
binding consequences. One such consequence could be to shield
defendants from onerous trial penalties should they decline the
offer. By placing constitutional limits on both the size of plea dis-
counts permitted and the size of trial penalties applied, prosecu-
tors' ability to coerce defendants to plead guilty will be reduced.
Such a limitation would go far to ensure that guilty pleas are vol-
untary in substance and not merely in form. It would also en-
hance the accuracy of the criminal justice process by discouraging
guilty pleas in weak cases that prosecutors would otherwise at-
tempt to resolve through generous plea offers. As a result, weaker
cases would either be dismissed or tried, and where they were
tried, more defendants would be acquitted as a result, ensuring
that more innocent defendants were acquitted. Some innocent
defendants, undoubtedly, would go to trial and be convicted, but
the limitations on trial penalties would ensure that such defend-
ants did not suffer onerous punishment as a penalty for exercising
their right to trial.
Paul Hayes was offered a chance to resolve the criminal charges
against him in exchange for what most likely would have amount-
ed to a five-year prison sentence. This offer plainly reflected the
prosecutor's estimation that five years in jail was sufficient to sat-
isfy the deterrent, retributive, and incapacitative purposes of
criminal punishment. The prosecutor's threat to charge Hayes un-
der an alternative statute that carried far more draconian penal-
ties quite clearly was intended to coerce Hayes into relinquishing
his right to trial. The career criminal statute, in essence, func-
tioned little differently than a gun to Hayes' head. Such blatantly
coercive bargaining tactics overtly undermine any reasonable op-
portunity for defendants to make voluntary choices about the ex-
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ercise of their right to trial. These tactics undermine the system's
ability to separate guilty and innocent defendants and drastically
shift the balance of power to prosecutors. Bordenkircher should be
overruled, and a more nuanced understanding of the scope of trial
penalties/plea discounts that may constitutionally be offered to
criminal defendants developed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia's prediction of the emergence of a new constitu-
tional law of plea-bargaining is, one can only hope, correct. Lafler
and Frye frankly acknowledged, in a way no Supreme Court case
has to date, that plea-bargaining is the central mechanism for re-
solving criminal accusations in the American criminal justice sys-
tem. In so doing, the Court has upped the ante regarding what
constitutes due process at the guilty plea stage. Lafler and Frye
recognize that defendants are entitled to accurate information and
advice, provided in timely fashion, in order to make critical deci-
sions regarding whether to accept plea bargains. The justification
for demanding effective legal assistance of counsel at the plea-
bargaining stage is predicated on the values that effective lawyer-
ing advances: accurate assessment of the costs and benefits of ac-
cepting a plea offer, an educated evaluation of the strength of the
state's case and of any affirmative defenses that might be availa-
ble, and a grounded estimate of the respective sentencing conse-
quences of pleading guilty versus a trial conviction. These values
are grounded in the fundamental idea that a plea of guilty and
waiver of the constitutional right to trial is consistent with due
process only if it is entered voluntarily and intelligently. None of
these values are advanced by withholding material exculpatory
evidence from defendants, or their lawyers, at the guilty plea
stage. Nor are these values advanced by permitting prosecutors to
make coercive plea-bargaining offers, the types of offers that crim-
inal defendants simply "can't refuse." Accordingly, Lafler and
Frye have set the Court on a path, the end point of which remains
unclear, but which clearly leads along the way to a finding that
Brady material is owed to all defendants prior to pleading guilty
and that there are substantive limits to plea discounts a prosecu-
tor may offer, or the trial penalties he or she may threaten, be-
yond the wide range of penalties lawfully available to prosecutors
and the probable cause needed to prove them, to induce criminal
defendants to enter guilty pleas.
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